Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

Daniel P. Ream v. David L. Tizen : Appellant's Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Romney, Madsen & Cummings; Attorneys for Appellant;
William J. Cayias; John A. Snow; Ray H. Ivie; Attorneys for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ream v. Fitzen, No. 15220 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/679

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE SATE OF UTAH
DANIEL P. REAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID L. PITZEN,
Defendant and Appellant,
vs.
DAVID L. PITZEN,

Ca.se No. 15220

Counterclaim Plaintiff
and Appellant.
vs.
PAUL REAM and BANK OF SALT LAKE,
Counterclaim Defendants
and Respondents,
REAW S BARGAIN ANNEX NO. 2,
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. , Judge

WILLIAM J. CAYIAS
1558 South 11th East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for Respondent,
Daniel P. Ream
JOHN A.

ROt.ffiEY, MADSEN & CUMMINGS
320 South Third East, Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

SNOW

RAY H. IVIE
P. o. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondent,
Paul Ream

141 East First South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent,
Bank of Salt Lake

F r LED
APR 12 197B

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clc:-~, Su?rc~o Co~rt,

Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - - - - - - - - -

1

ARGUMENT

2

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

IT WAS ERROR
POINT I.
$22,483 RENT, AND IT
CREDIT FOR $6,047.47
VENTURE B&~K ACCOUNT
VENTURE PURPOSES - -

TO CHARGE FITZEN WITH
WAS ERROR TO DENY FITZEN
DEPOSITED IN THE JOINT
AND DISBURSED FOR JOINT
- - - - - - - - - - - -

POINT II. THE PURPORTED $6,000 LIEN IN FAVOR
OF PAUL REAM WAS NULL AND VOID AS TO ALL
PARTIES IN THIS ACTION - - - - - - - - -

2

11

POINT III. EVEN IF THE $6,000 LIEN TO PAUL
REAM IS NOT VOIDED AS TO THE OTHER RESPONDENTS,
IT REQUIRES A $6, 0 0 0 REDUCTION IN DAN REAM'S
EQUITY IN THE JOINT VENTURE - - - - - - - - - - - 13
CONCLUSION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

21

EXHIBITS ANNEXED HERETO:
DlO-BSL
026-F
D28-F
D30-F
031-F

Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter
Letter

from Bank of Salt Lake 10/17-75
from Fitzen to Ream 8/11-75
to Bank of Salt Lake 10/28/75
to Ream's Attorney 11/10/75
to Bank of Salt Lake 11/10/75

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED:
Page

13 Am Jur 2d, Cancellation of Instruments,
Sections 7 and 16 - - - - - - - - - - - 11
Dale v. Dale
57 N.M. 593, 261 P 2d 438 (1953} - - --5
Norback v. Board of Directors of Church
Extension Soc.
84 u 506, 39 p 2d 339 (1934} - - - - Street v. Graham
2 Ut 2d 144, 270 p 2d 456

l)C

ll I q '7- 3

P

c

sv

c

S

10

70

(1954 -

11- cl
~~

-

a;

-

-

- -

11
6

s-(·+1'>/

_ )- C

Lc

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1'1
- 1'/

IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL P . REA.I\1,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
DAVID L. PITZEN,
Defendant and Appellant,

vs.
DAVID L. PITZEN,
Counterclaim Plaintiff
and Appellant,

Case No. 15220

vs.
PAUL REAM and BANK OF SALT LAKE,
Counterclaim Defendants
and Respondents,
REAM I s BARGAIN AJ.'INEX NO. 2,
INCORPORATED, a Utah corporation,

Defendant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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SCOPE OF APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Respondent, Daniel P. Ream, hereinafter referred to
as Ream, has filed a brief on this appeal consisting of four
points.

The thrust of Point IV thereof, as we perceive it, is

that said respondent claims that the abstract of appellant,
David L. Fitzen, hereinafter referred to as Fitzen, does not
set forth enough facts to justify relief on appeal.

It is not

asserted that the facts set forth in the abstract are inaccun:,
We trust the facts set forth on this appeal are sufficient to
warrant relief, and thus no attempt in this brief is made to
treat that point separately.

Point I of Ream's brief is deal:

with in Point I of this Reply Brief.

Point III of Ream's brie:

is dealt with in Point III herein.
Respondent, Bank of Salt Lake, filed a brief, and tt:
brief was adopted by respondent, Paul Ream, by virtue of the:
ter of his attorney to the Supreme Court dated December 13,
adopting that brief as his own.

Point I of the brief of resW

ent, Bank of Salt Lake, and Point II of Ream's brief are esser:
..

i

tially the same and are considered in Point II of this bnet. ·
Point II of the brief of Bank of Salt Lake is well taken Cas:
respondents, Bank of Salt Lake and Paul Ream)
a new hearing will be necessary,

although it would appear t:-.a:

new trial would be more appropriate.
can in equity direct a

in the sense t~.:.

Of course,

the

Supre~

judgment in favor of Fitzen and agal~::
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-2ARGUMENT
POINT I.

IT WAS ERROR TO CHARGE FITZEN WITH $22,483 RENT, &~D
IT WAS ERROR TO DENY FITZEN CREDIT FOR $6,047.47
DEPOSITED IN THE JOINT VENTURE BANK ACCOUNT AND DISBURSED FOR JOINT VE~TURE PURPOSES.
In response to Point I of the brief of respondent,

Daniel P. Ream, hereinafter referred to as Ream, the following
items should be noted:
1.

A substantial part of Ream's brief and particu-

larly of Point I thereof (not to mention respondent's abstract)
is devoted to an attempt to show that, because certain of Fitzen's
exhibits were not admitted for all purposes, that there is no
evidence to support Fitzen's claimed errors, inasmuch as Fitzen
has not on this appeal claimed error in regard to those rulings.

In his abstract Ream sets forth the ruling of the trial court
admitting into evidence with limitations Exhibits 17 through 23.
As we have reread those portions of the transcript, we have
almost regretted not having brought those rulings before the
court as error--as a matter of principle.

It appears to us to

be rather clear that a very comprehensive and adequate foundation was laid for the admission of those exhibits, and that any
imperfections in the way those records were kept would go only
to weight and not admissibility.
The fact remains that Fitzen made his case without
those "limited purpose" exhibits.
~stablished

Fi tzen 's case on appeal is

by the testimony of the witnesses as abstracted in
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Pitzen's abstract, which has not been contradicted by Reu

a~

by the other exhibits which have been admitted into evidence ::
all purposes.

Fi tzen relies particularly upon the exhibits Se',

forth in his abstract.

Pitzen's accountant, Ernest Deters,

pared Exhibit Dl7 and,

as stated above, that effort was adrn:c:

only to show appellant's accounting.

Nevertheless, this same

accountant was permitted to testify at length and in detail

ill::

I

the records of Pitzen, and Exhibit D36F was admitted later in:',
trial as a summary of his testimony

(T. 413).

Furthermore, ti.',

plaintiff's own Exhibit Pl2 was admitted into evidence, and tt
contains the records of the Fi tzen-Ream bank account as opposec
to the Bonneville Wrecking Co. bank records.
Exhibit Pl2
2.

(R. 94)

It is upon that

that Pitzen's Point I is based.

Pitzen claims in his brief that it was error

the trial court to charge defendant with the sum of $22,483 r2:
of the equipment of the joint venture without regard to whethe:i
I

said sum was ever received or actually earned.
that, Ream in his brief at page 10 says:

In response to

"Whether any sum was

ever received by the joint venture from the rental of the equi:!
ment is not material."

That was the contention of Ream at ths,

trial, and that is what the trial court accepted and adjudged,
The only evidence as to what was actually received

(as

OEJ? 051 :

to what Ream thought should have been received) was that at k:
$5.259 was not received on joint venture jobs.

See ExhlbLt
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setting forth a summary of the testimony of Ernest Deters.
was no evidence contradicting this.
what should have been collected.

There

Ream's evidence went only to

As justification for this, Ream

is apparently claiming that Pitzen was managing partner, and as
such was somehow a guarantor of the income of the joint venture.
This is not supported by the facts or the law.

In paragraph 7

of the agreement between the parties, Pitzen was indeed designated the managing joint venturer as to the "direction and control" of the truck.

However, the agreement provided also in said

paragraph 7 thereof:

"In all other matters, each of the joint

venturers shall have an equal interest in the conduct of the
affairs of the joint venture."

It was thus equally the respon-

sibility of both partners to see that records were kept, that
accountants were retained if that were deemed to be necessary.
Neither of the partners was an accountant; they were engaged in
a rather rough-and-ready occupation, to-wit, demolition, and
neither kept records as perhaps a trained accountant would.
(Certainly Ream's records, Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, are not models,)
That, however, is not a justification for denying Pitzen his just
due.

Ream is attempting to say that it doesn't really matter

what the equities are between the parties, that Pitzen had the
duty to keep the records, and if there were any imperfections in
the records, Pitzen should be chargeable with that.
':he law.

Rather,

That is not

the court should endeavor to ascertain the true
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equities between the parties based upon the records that are
available, and that is certainly so where, as here, the recor:'
are kept in accordance with the abilities and talents of me
parties.

In Dale v. Dale, 57 N. M.

593, 261 P 2d 438 (1953) :.·.

court held that it was proper to consider the nature of me be::
and the ability of the partners, even a managing partner.
At page 11 of his brief, Ream states:

"In the abse: I

of fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith as to the acts per·'
formed by Ream, the joint venture had to bear the loss and
Fitzen was entitled to no credit for those matters."

If that

is the rule of law which binds Fi tzen, it certainly is the ru>
which binds Ream.

It would appear that in the absence of fm:

culpable negligence or bad faith, Fitzen is not responsible t:
Ream for collecting on every account any more than Ream is
responsible to Fitzen to collect on every account.

It is a r''

business that has a 100% recovery of all of its accounts.
that is the burden the trial court casts upon Fitzen.
Ream asserts at page 10 of his brief that: "Under

:.~

term of the joint venture agreement, he (Fitzen) was chargeab:,
!

for the reasonable rental for the equipment use."

We have

examined the instrument carefully and find no such term and
mit that there is none.

5-

Pitzen's only obligation is to share!

equally with Ream all profits and losses.

He is not3.guarar.:
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In support of Pitzen's position on this matter, we
cite the case of Street vs. Graham, 2 Ut 2d 144, 270 P 2d 456
(1954), where this court held that it was improper to charge
the defendant with the "rental" value of the partnership property used by him, but rather that the proper remedy was an
award of one-half the actual net profts from that equipment.
The recovery was thus limited to actual receipts and a recovery
for "idle time" of the equipment was disallowed specifically.
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~~

At page 10 of his brief, respondent asserts

Fi tzen "commingled the accounts", meaning presumably those of t:;:
Ritzen-Ream joint venture with those of his own company, Bonne·'
ville 'ivrecking Co.

The testimony was undisputed that, because

of the damages to the joint venture equipment, Fitzen was
I

required to advance from his own company most of the operating!
funds for the joint venture.

Perhaps Ream is suggesting that

those loans or advances by Fi tzen to the joint venture should

I

I

not have been paid by him directly, but rather should have firs-[

I

been formally loaned to the joint venture and then checks
out of the Fi tzen-Ream account.

wn::j

There would perhaps be no thine

wrong with that procedure, but i t appears that since Fitzen di:
not have to make those loans or advances to the joint venture:·
the first place, that i t would be unduly harsh to attempt to
penalize him for making the advances in the most convenient
to him.

Even the Court had no

'"I

trouble in allowing Fitzen ere:.[

for the sum of $26,921.53 expenses incurred on behalf of the !
joint venture.

Although Fitzen claimed more in the wayofexpe:•J

than the Court allowed,

this appeal does not involve that mat:•·

What is claimed on this appeal is that i t was error to charge
Fitzen with said $22,483 "rent", and that, even assuming that
Fi tzen is chargeable with the said sum (which we don • t concede:
the Court should have allowed Fitzen credit for $6,047,47

act;~j

. !

collected and deposited in the Fitzen-Ream joint venture ba~
account and disbursed therefrom as shown in Exhibit Pl2.
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Fitzen has not claimed that he is entitled to reimbursement for any expenditures made from the Fitzen-Ream account, as
those expenditures were made from joint venture deposits. Fitzen
has only claimed reimbursement for Bonneville Wrecking Company
expenditures on behalf of the joint venture, and although the
court allowed him $26,921.53 therefor, the court erroneously
denied his entitlement to credit for the deposits made directly
into the Fitzen-Ream bank account.
With respect to Pitzen's claim that he was not given
credit for $6,047.47 actually received and deposited into the
joint venture bank account, Ream's only response appears on page
11 of his brief in which he says:

"In addition, Fitzen was unable

to establish his right to have the Fitzen-Ream account figures
credited to the joint venture since he was unaware of just what
moneys were deposited in the account and how they were disbursed.

He was unable to allocate funds to transactions.

He simply did

not meet his burden of proof with reference to the accounting."
In our initial brief herein, we have set forth the actual
amounts of the deposits, and these were admitted in evidence as part
of Exhibit Pl2, and they are uncontested.

It really does not lie

in the mouth of Ream to claim that Fitzen did not establish the
deposits.

Likewise Exhibit Pl2

(plaintiff's own exhibit) shows

the disbursements, and at the trial Ream did not take issue with
ony of them.

Only now on this appeal does he attempt to claim
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that Fitzen did not establish that the disbursements were pr 0,,
At no time at the trial did Ream claim that the disbursements
were not proper, and there is no evidence that they were not.
Actually, he does not claim that they are improper even now.
He only claims that Fi tzen somehow failed to meet his burden
with respect thereto.

On analysis, his only explanation is

that certain exhibits at the trial were

(as stated above) onlj·

admitted for limited purposes, but the fact remains that the
Fitzen-Ream account (Exhibit Pl2) was not subject to any such
limitations.

Apparently Ream feels that unless Fitzen has a

cise memory of all details of all transactions in the FitzenReam checking account, he is not entitled to any credit there:::
I

That is a harsh and unjustified position and is not the law.

'!1:
I

believe that it is a fair statement that the memories of all m:l
are more or less imperfect and that is one reason we have bank rec::1
Exhibit Pl2 was admitted for all purposes and constitutes a
proper record of those transactions independently of Fitzen's
memory as to every minute detail.
In fact counsel for Ream carefully examined Fitzen ::
the Fitzen-Ream bank account (T217-218)
with the entries found in the account.

He did not take

iss"i

Rather, it appearsto'.:'

been his sole purpose to show that only a relatively small nu.~;
of the joint venture transactions were in fact handled in f1;:
account.

Far from condemning or impeaching the Fi tzen-Ream or
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account, it was the position of counsel for Ream at the trial
that all joint venture transactions should have been handled
through the Fitzen-Ream account.
actions which were not

He contended that the trans-

run through that account were tainted,

not that the ones that were run through it were improper.

In

his closing argument, Ream's counsel, Mr. Cayias, stated at
~age

536 of the transcript:
"Now, Your Honor, the books and records as presented
in this matter, Your Honor, are the books and records, in
substance, of Bonneville Wrecking Company. Theyare not
the books and records of the joint venture of Fitzen and
Ream.
And so, Your Honor, we don't think that there's
been the strict proof accorded in this matter that the
joint venture is entitled to."
It is clear from this that it is Bonneville Wrecking

Company records that he was condemning at the trial, not the
Fitzen-Ream records.

Using that approach, counsel was able to

severely limit the Bonneville Wrecking Company advances for which
Fitzen was given credit in the accounting.

Having gained what he

em with that approach, counsel now for the first time attacks
me joint venture records also.

What he is really saying thereby

is that the distinction he made at the trial between the joint
venture records and the Bonneville \-'lrecking Company records is
not valid after all, and if that is so, a new trial is the proper
remedy.

Ream has not impeached the joint venture bank account

:ecords, and Fitzen should at least be given credit for the
$6,047.47 deposited into that account.
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POINT II.

THE PURPORTED $6,000 LIEN IN FAVOR OF PAUL REAH
WAS NULL AND VOID AS TO ALL PARTIES IN THIS ACTION,
The thrust of Fi tzen' s Amended Counterclaim is to ha·.

the court declare the purported lien to Paul Ream in the 5 ~

0:

$6,000 declared nulland void.

In paragraph 2 of the prayer

thereof, Fi tzen asks

"That the court adjudge and dec:'

(R.

69) :

I

that the aforesaid purported lien of $6,000 is null, void and ::!
j
.
no force of (sic) effect whatever, and that coun terc 1 a1.m defen:·j
ants have no rights in said truck by virtue thereof."

I

An act;c:.l
I

to obtain such relief is and traditionally has been equitable, j
and that, we believe, notwithstanding the claim that three par:.l
act together fraudulently to put it of record.
In addition to the authority cited in our initial br:i
we refer the court to 13 Am Jur 2d, Cancellation of Instrumer.ts
Sections 7 and 16.

In said Section 7, it is stated;

"Equitable jurisdiction to cancel is exercised
basis of a protective or preventative justice when a ~~
is afforded relief from agreements, securities, deeds, or
other instruments on the principle that these instruments
may be vexatiously or injuriously used against him when
evidence to impeach them may be lost, or that they may
throw a cloud of suspicion over his title or interest."
In the case of Norback v. Board of Directors of Ch~/
Extension Soc., 84 U 506,

39 P 2d 339

(1934), the Supreme Couc:!

of Utah said:
. . If the issues are legal or the major issue
legal, either party is entitled upon proper demand to a
jury trial; but, if the issues are equitable or <:he .
major issues to be resolved by an application of equlc,··
the legal issues being merely subsidiary, the actlon
should be regarded as equitable and the rules of equit:
apply."
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In accordance with the foregoing authorities, this
action is equitable as to all parties, and the Supreme Court can
and, we believe, should, overrule the trial court and find that
the purported $6,000 lien was indeed null and void as to Pitzen.
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POINT III.

EVEN IF THE $6,000 LIEN TO PAUL REAM IS NOT VOIDEc
AS TO THE OTHER RESPONDENTS, IT REQUIRES A $6,000
REDUCTION IN DAN REAM'S EQUITY IN THE JOINT VENTURE.
In Point III of Ream's brief, he asserts that Fitzer:':

position on the $6,000 lien to Paul Ream was not raised in the

i

lower court.

This is truly an incredible assertion.

If there

I

is one point that is spread upon the record of this case in th:
lower court from one end to the other, it is that Fi tzen has
denied the validity of and has objected to the purported $6,00:
lien in favor of Paul Ream.

Ream's counsel even responded to

said claim in his argument to the court at the conclusion of
the trial.
stated,

On page 556 of the transcript, counsel for

Re~

"The $6,000 was strictly a loan to Dan Ream, and he

wouldn't loan that money to Dan Ream unless he had some protection.

And i t was all understood at the time that they were toj

1

get the loan, Paul Ream had to have the protection as far as
these $6,000 he had loaned his son.
And again at page 558:

It was just that simple."!

"I can't see, Your Honor, in the regu;

I
I

annals of legal thinking on damages how you could claim a $3,0c'
loss because Dan borrowed $6,000 from his father to put in th:
joint venture.

There's no proof, no basis,

for that."

Fitzen seeks to have the liens voided as against at:
the parties to this lawsuit, but even if the court should

~ot I

that it is not void as to the Bank of Salt Lake and Paul Rea"J
it certainly constitutes a "$3,000 loss" to Pitzen.

(Requiri::

partner to contribute $6,000 to the joint venture appea.cs
equivalent
of Law
ordering
partner
toInstitute
pay
directl:/
'::o t~e
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding that
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I

-14partner one-half of said amount, or in other words $3,000.)
It should be noted from the foregoing closing arguments of Daniel P. Ream's counsel that there is no contention
mat the $6,000 is a loan to the joint venture.
a loan to Ream.

It was strictly

Likewise, it should be noted that in the brief

filed herein by the Bank of Salt Lake, it is admitted at page 2:
"Because Dan Ream did not have the necessary funds, Paul Ream
agreed to loan Dan Ream the $6,000 to purchase the truck, but
on the condition that Paul Ream be granted a lien on the White
Truck to secure such $6,000.00 loan."
Paul Ream has not filed a separate brief herein, but
in a letter to the court dated December 13, 1977, accepted as
his own the brief of the Bank of Salt Lake.

Thus, even Paul Ream

concedes that the money was a loan to his son and not to the joint
venture.
(Ex. P4)
In paragraph 11 of the joint venture agreement,/it is
provided that:

"Each of the parties hereto agrees to assume and

pay his own separate debts and to indemnify the other against the
same and all expenses on account thereof."

Fitzen contends, and

'-'e believe that the record bears out, that he is not subject to
the burden of the said $6,000 lien which he did not sign.

Even

if Fitzen is held to have ratified that transaction, it is still
not a joint venture debt as between the joint venturers.
bet~veen

As

the joint venturers, it is a charge against the interest

of Dan Ream in the joint venture.
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I t is the contention of Fitzen that Ream's initial

contribution to the joint venture of $6,000 should be charged
back against him by virtue of the lien to his father, which is
his personal debt, not that of the joint venture.

The over-

whelming weight of the evidence was that the truck was lost

cc

the joint venture because of the existence of the $6,000 lien
to Paul Ream.

Having agreed to indemnify Fi tzen against any

loss by virtue of Ream's personal debts, the loss of the truci
should be charged to Ream's account.

In short, we believe tha:

Ream's contribution of $6,000 was conditioned upon Ream's see1:l,
to it that Fitzen suffered no loss by reason thereof.
did not do.

This he

By analogy, if a set of tires had been charged tc

the joint venture for the personal use of Ream (or Fitzen for ;

that matter) , would anyone contend that the account of the jo: I
venturer receiving the tires should be charged in said amount:
Here too, the debt in favor of Paul Ream of $6,000, being for
the personal use of Ream, must in fairness be charged to hill.
In his Point III,
Fi tzen has been shown.

Ream claims that no actual loss t:

This is simply not the case.

On Augus·i

I
1975, Fitzen sent a letter to Ream giving notice of terrninati:i

of the joint venture in accordance with paragraph 13 thereof.]
(See Exhibit D26F).)

At that time the truck was in for repa:>l

On October 17, 1975, the defendant, Bank of Salt Lake (·.vhich
became Commercial Security Bank)

sent to the joint ventureys

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

letter telling them to pay off the indebtedness

(which at that

time had a net payoff of $21,558.56 (see also T 375) as shown in
said letter) within ten days or the bank would turn the item
over to Paul Ream or would sell it to the highest bidder.
letter was admitted as Exhibit DlOBSL.

That

The bank later granted

an extension to November 10, 1975, and stated to Fitzen's attorney, Robert C. Cummings, that the bank would notify said counsel
of any proposed disposition of the truck and give Fitzen information as to the time and place of such disposition so that
Fitzen could bid on the item.

The facts of that extension are

not contested, and the substance of that conversation is set
forth in Exhibit D28F, which is a letter dated October 28, 1975,
from Fitzen's attorney to Bank of Salt Lake.

(See also T 358 and

364-365).
The existence of the $6,000 lien to Paul Ream was
ascertained on November 5, 1975

(T 368).

The Bank of Salt Lake disposed of the truck on or about
)lovernber 25, 1975,

(this date was stipulated to by counsel (T 382))

and Bank of Salt Lake gave notice to counsel for Fi tzen on or about
that date.

This notice was in the form of a phone call from the

bank's attorney, Mr. Snow, to Fitzen's attorney advising that the
truck had been assigned to one of Paul Ream's companies.
o~~ortunity
t~is

No

was given to Fitzen to make a bid on the truck and

was the first time notice of any disposition was given
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(T 382 and 383).
Prior to that date three offers had been made on the
truck.

An offer for $22,000 was made by Mr. Seegmiller (T 38]

and in addition an offer was made by Mr. Maxfield of Maxfield

!

Trucking for $22,500.

The third offer was made by Pitzen hirnse.l
I
where he offered to assume the indebtedness on the truck at Ba:l
of Salt Lake and also to assume the debt on the tractor and
pay into the joint venture $6,000.

tol

Later on he made another

offer, the tenor of which was the same except that he would

I

I

actually refinance the truck in addition to paying $6,000 intc I
the joint venture.

We set forth here actual portions of the

transcript on this matter as follows

(T 389-390):

Mr. Cummings, I believe you have already testified
that there were the three offers, if I am not mistaken,
including the Seegmiller matter?

"Q

A

That's correct.

Q
And what amounts were they in each instance and
from which source?
A
Well, the sources of the one was Seegmiller for
$22,000.
During this period of time, I suppose about
October 28th, I don't recall the exact date, we ran an
ad in the Salt Lake Tribune to try and get the highest
amount of money we could.
In response to that ad, I . !
received a call from a Mr. Maxfield of Maxfield Truck1ng.[
I told him where he could go to look at the truck, He .
did that, called me back, and offered $22,500 for it,
which I conveyed in these letters, and also indicated
to Mr. Snow.
It appears in several of the letters I
told him about it, and I also told Mr. Snow about it
on the 23rd.
The third was David Pitzen's offer, wherein he
offered to assume the indebtedness on the truck at
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Bank of Salt Lake, and also to assume the debt on the
tractor, and to pay into the Joint Venture $6,000.
That was his intitial offer. Later on, he offered
actually to refinance the truck in addition to paying
$6,000 if that was the problem.
Both of those offers carne in sequence.
I don't
recall the exact dates, but they were conditioned
upon a clean title, getting rid of that $6,000 lien.
It wouldn't have much meaning in the face of that.
Q

And were any of those offers accepted?

A

They were not. "
The substance of these offers was conveyed to the Bank

and to Dan Ream as seen from the above.

T 376) and Exhibit

See also (T 371-373 and

D30F and Exhibits D31F.

It thus appears to be clear that, had Ream taken care
of the obligation to his father, the truck could have been disposed of at a profit to the joint venture of at least $6,000 over
and above the indetbedness to the Bank of Salt Lake.

Ream's con-

tention that damages have not been proven in this regard is not
born out by the record.

The exhibits relating to the foregoing

are set out at the end of this brief for convenience and are
D30F
Exhibits D26F, D28F,/D31F and DlOBSL (return receipts attached
to some

of these exhibits are not set forth in this brief.)
It should be noted further that in the Uniform Cornrner-

cial Code, even if the joint venture itself be held in default to
the Bank of Salt Lake, the Bank of Salt Lake has an obligation
~der

the Code to notify the joint venture as to any proposed dis-

?Osition, and this for two reasons:

(l) because the said statute
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requires it (See Section 70A-9-504 (3)), and (2)
agreed to do so (See Exhibit D28F).
Section 70A-9-506

because the 06..
!

Furthermore, pursuant to

(since the collateral was not disposed of

until November 25, 1975), the joint venture

(in the language :'I
I

the statute) had the right:

11

At any time be fore the secured :'.

:i

has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its

I

position . .

(to)

redeem the collateral by tendering fulfiLl

of all obligations secured by the collateral .
expenses)
statute.)

11
•

.

.

(together .;: .

(The words in parenthesis are a paraphrase of the
It is therefore submitted that Fi tzen complied witl,

the requirements of the statute in making a good faith offer::
Ream and to the bank, but even that is not really the issue.
The issue is whether or not a bona fide offer for the purchase
of the truck had been made so as to enable the court to make; I
reasonable determination as to the value of the truck which'"
lost to the joint venture.

.. I

That certainly has been accompllsr'l

It is clear that the loss to the joint venture is the $6,000 :!
by Fi tzen over and above the indebtedness on the truck,

That

$6,000 would have gone into the joint venture and was the bes:l
offer made on the truck.

It should be noted that the joint·:',

ture agreement provides in paragraph 14 that upon dissolutioo

1

the joint venture " ...the highest bidder is hereby given the::/
to purchase the aforesaid truck and ot~er equipment, if an::·,-

the joint venture .

Pitzen's bid certainly complied
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that requirement and establishes the loss to the joint venture
at $6,000.
The truck was lost to the joint venture by reason of
the $6,000 lien.

One of Paul Ream's companies obtained the truck

from the Bank of Salt Lake (T 72, 78) and Dan Ream testified at
the trial
(T 73-79).

(January of 1977) that he was then using the truck
The truck cost approximately $38,000 new in 1974

($800 down plus $30,249.72 financed).
•.vrecked, it had been fully repaired.

Although it had been
The balance owing when it

was repossessed in November of 1975 was $21,558.56.

In November

of 1975 Pitzen offered $6,000 for it over and above the debt to
Bank of Salt Lake.

Dan Ream has used it since then and was still

using it at the time of the trial.

It would seem that the mini-

mum demands of justice require that the joint venture account
of Dan Ream be charged with the loss of $6,000 by reason of
the loss of the truck to the joint venture.
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CONCLUSION
It has not been the intention of the appellant, Fit 2,
to impose upon this court the burden of wading through a vol::::_
no us accounting.

Although, as stated, appellant feels that :'.-

lower court erred in many areas, he has "licked his wounds" or.
most of those.

For purposes of this appeal, only the most

obvious errors have been cited in the hope that those errors
could be demonstrated to the Supreme Court with sufficient
clarity,

that at least in those areas the action of the lower

court might be corrected and the appellant might receive some,
if not all, of the compensation to which he is entitled.

We

certainly feel that appellant should receive credit for the
actual moneys deposited by him in the Fi tzen-Ream account in
the sum of $6,047.47, and further that he is entitled to haVe'
the court declare that the purported $6,000 lien of Paul
(which was never signed by Mr. Pitzen)

is void.

~~

In any

event Pitzen is entitled to the benefit of an appropriate
reduction of $6,000 in Ream's joint venture account by reasor.
of the loss of $6,000 to the joint venture when the trial

viai

lost by reason of the $6,000 lien to Paul Ream, which was D'"
Ream's sole responsibility.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY,

'1.::\.DS Eel

Gordon ."..

& CDI'L'!I:lGS

~-lads en
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Commercial Securitv Bank
tl

:}fcRru.Y OFFICE
PosT OFFICE

5101

Box 7580

SouTH STATE STREET

lft"IUU.Y, "C"HH

84107

lktober 17, 1975

:11". Daniel P. Ream

and David Fitzen

•701 Pasque '!lay
Salt Lake City, Utah
:lear Mr. Ream:
lie currently have possession of your 1975 White Dumpt Truck Serial No.

KOP5RHDD12310, reflecting a remaining balance owing of $22,713.79 and a
net payoff of $21,558.56.
•<e will hold this unit for a period of ten (10) days from the date of this
letter to enable you to obtain funds and redeem the unit.
If we do not
hear from you as indicated, the unit will be either tt:trned over to Paul
~eam, or sold to the highest bidder.
Should a deficiency result from
' the sale either to Mr. Ream (Paul), or other purchaser, you will be held
responsible for this deficiency.

'.ie encourage you to exhaust every effort and obtain funds to redeem the
Clllit as indicated.

Sincerely yours,

v. /:::~~ _/;:~a.

Scott 9lson
Collection Department

lSO: 1t

:::
:::

Javid ?itzen
File
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DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT _
· j_
C~tober

e

t--'

2 81 1975

~. Larr] C~ristensen
Ban:< of Sal~ :::.a:-:e

3039 Soilt.'1 State
Sal.t

~a~..:e

Ci.:;:~l,

St~eet

::.;.tah

letter ..,ill co:1:i~ c~:i- teleplione cou.versa~ion of·
23, 1375.
I~ t~at ~slep~one ~on7e=3ation I advise~
you. t::=.t Dan ~8a_""J. an.::. ~avid Fi::zen :.,r~r.: ..=..tta:r!pti:lg <:a resol":le
t~= ~if=icul~i.es 3..5 to ·.,;!-lo r,..rould be ~l:e· .5:..J.c:::asso= to t..'~i.=;
eq'Jipmen-:. an G. r.'/:-._o COUld tban 1 in turr: 1 .::or:;e i:1 an=. r.:ake
~::is

Octo~er

arrangecents

~!=~ you.
You indicated to ~e that yoil wo~li
·.1::~~1 _:ovc::t~e= l)t ..l. be=or~ ~...:...--:d~:--:.3.:-<.ing an:.: steps
t: ~is?ose of ~~e aq~i~~ent in order ~o ~llow ~3 ~o =esol·/8
:~i5 ji.::i-=ul~f :;,:t.~"·een ourselves.

Jold o:f

Yo'J li.~:e,.:Tise .::.q=~ed -:.::at :..: , fo= a:-1~ r~a.sc:1, ·.rc f,,:e=e· :lOt a~.:...-=
to ··TC!:!< out -:.::.:..5 :::at-c2~ J.::d a C.is-oo3:..-=..:.c:1 bv :.::e. ::;an~ ~.-:er~
neces3a.=:t, t!:3.= -.-re ~1c:.:!d be aC.7ised of =:-:.= ~i::-:e· 3-n:::. ?:l:l::e so
t~a.: -:e -=auld :::c::-.a a:1C:. ::,ic. or.. it as :!=. 2itzen ·..;oul.:l ~a::'i:1i.~.=:y
wa::.t t..o r.1ake a :si:;, :or t....~a eqai~:J.ent i:1 t..~a:. even·t.
1

Ter1 truly yours

I

ROBERT C. CUlo1MI:lGS
~sh
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MADSEN. CUMMINGS & HARRIS
::::;;:c:::OC"' A '.1.J.=5C:',
~,;a~~T" :::
C- Y'-1 ",CS

P

:l

:: ~.a.~=- 5
SANFCIRO ~·ORSE..-..SE'<

clover..ber l.Cl,

o

ac.x

SALT LAKE ClTY

~'-3SEL-

17S.3

UTAH 9..1110

1915

Mr. William J. Cayias
Attorney at L.J.'"
1558 Sout~ 11th East
Salt Lake City, Ctah
Dear Bill:
R~·

?itzen vs.

Dan Ream

Although we have waited now ~or a good many days for your
stiPulation which was to be designed to facilitate biddlng
for- the White tr'J.ck:, etc., it has not arri•Jed.
.:-,s I
indicated to you some time ago the Bank of Salt Lake
indicated that t~ey would withhold further action through
the lOth of ~overnber 1975 to Jive us an opportunity to
work out our ?roblerns as between Ream and Fitzen.
As you know, se•1e:::-al ·.veeks ago we offered on behalf o~ Fitzen
that he would assume the balance with the B.J.nk of Salt Lake
on the ~·lhite truck, that he ·,.;ould lik·:;wise assume the balance
on the First Security Bank and would ?ay Ln addition to the
joint venture $6000.
To date that is, I believe, the best
offer that has been made and Lnasmuch as time runs out tod~
I take it that it is the only of~er.
If vou will be aood
enough to furnish sufficient releases to Bank o~ Salt-Lake
so that they can convey good title to us, we will see that
they are ?romptly paid the balance owing.
As I lndicated ~.
you before ·.-1e take the posl tion that the so-called second a~c
third liens are in fact not that at all.
The second lien, 1:
it is valid at all, appears to be nothing more than a guar~~
that Paul Ream ~ill not sustain a~y loss ~f he is called to .
?3. y anyt~i:1g as a gua..:- an t.o r.
L'ndc:: t~e above arooo sal, :;.e' ::
CQ'i..:!:'S-2, r.~·i2.l r!o~ b·~ C3.l:'=d :.JpOn :.a ?-2':" ar-.~·t.hi:--.S
~nd ":~e:-e::~:
~e ~a~e the ;as~~tcn tha~ t~e secc~d l~en LS
vo:d.
T~2
"::;..:.=C. 1:..=!1 ·.v3.S :1~n.:::::.r' si~l.·~G
'Jr3.~/::.·.:: ~"'.:i :.3 s::-::..::.:~· =.. 7::e:CS~";-I
I

-I
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Wllliarn J. C!yias
:lo•;e:cber 2.0, 19-:'S

~r.

Page T"".vo

matter between the two ~earns, and as far as I can determine
amounts to nothing more than a right in Paul to take over
the position of Qan, but he will still, as I see it, be
subject to the JOint venture agreement.
We, therefore, take
the oosition that the releases of those two liens should be
im:ne::iia tely delivered to the Bank of Salt Lake.

/'POBE?.':' C.

c:;:.rHclGS

:1Sh
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